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MILKOVICH REVISITED: "SAVING" THE
OPINION PRIVILEGE
EDWARD M. SUSSMAN
Language is a labyrinth of paths. You approach from one side and
know your way about; you approach the same place from another side
and no longer know your way about.
-Ludwig Wittgenstein 1
INTRODUCTION
I wish to offer an explanation of Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co. 2
that "saves" the constitutional protection of the opinion privilege. I
place "save" in quotation marks because I do not believe that the consti-
tutional protection of the opinion privilege was lost, or even misplaced,
by Milkovich-although the case has been misread in a manner that sug-
gests otherwise. 3 This Note reviews Milkovich, and rebuts a serious mis-
understanding of the case that has found its way into several law
reviews. 4 The Note then discusses the constitutional dimensions of libel
actions based on statements capable of more than one reasonable
interpretation.
Milkovich provided the Supreme Court with an opportunity to ad-
dress squarely whether the broad category of speech commonly labeled
as "opinion" is afforded special protection by the Constitution. The case
involved a libel suit brought against an Ohio newspaper. The suit alleged
that a sports column appearing in the newspaper defamed Michael
1. LuDwiG WrTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS § 203 (1953).
2. 110 S. Ct 2695 (1990).
3. See eg., Anthony D'Amato, Harmful Speech and the Culture of Indeterminacy, 32 WM. &
MAYt L. REv. 329, 343 n.56 (1991) (arguing that the Milkovich opinion is "incoherent" and sug-
gesting that the Court may have wished to "encourage more libel lawsuits"); Nat Stem, Defamation,
Epistemology, and the Erosion (But Not Destruction) of the Opinion Privilege, 57 TENN. L. REv. 595,
595 (1990) ("At a more significant and ominous level, Milkovich points to a tilt toward the less
skeptical of the various and sometimes competing epistemological assumptions hitherto employed by
courts in deciding whether a statement is actionable as containing a factual accusation."); T.R. Ha-
ger, Note, Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.: Lost Breathing Space-Supreme Court Stifles Freedom
of Expression by Eliminating First Amendment Opinion Privilege, 65 TUL. L. REv. 944, 952 (1991)
(predicting as a result of Milkovich, "rising libel litigation" and "a severe chilling impact," as well as
stating that "the Supreme Court has unanimously disposed of a useful tool for ensuring freedom of
expression").
4. See supra note 3.
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Milkovich, a local high school wrestling coach.5 In its defense, the news-
paper asserted that the sports column was protected by the First Amend-
ment as a statement of opinion.6 The Ohio Court of Appeals agreed, and
affirmed summary judgment against Milkovich. 7 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari to consider the question of constitutional protection
for statements of opinion, the Court's first direct examination of the is-
sue.8 Previously, however, the Court had dealt extensively with related
issues,9 and the doctrine developed by these cases formed the basis of
what was widely recognized as a constitutional opinion privilege.10
In Milkovich, the Court declined to fashion "an additional separate
constitutional privilege for 'opinion.'"11 But while reasserting existing
doctrine, the Court emphasized the constitutional protection that state-
ments of opinion already enjoyed, specifically holding that statements not
asserting "actual facts" are not subject to libel suit. 12 In so doing, the
Court was careful to state that merely labeling a statement "opinion," or
inserting words such as "in my opinion" before a factual statement, is
insufficient to trigger constitutional protection for the statement. 13
"[Couching [factual] statements in [the] terms of opinion" does not cre-
ate a blanket exemption from libel.14 Rather than creating "an artificial
dichotomy between 'opinion' and fact," the Court stated that existing
5. See Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2699-700.
6. Id. at 2698.
7. See Milkovich v. News-Herald, 545 N.E. 2d 1320, 1324 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989).
8. See Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2708 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
9. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988) (holding that the First
Amendment protects an advertisement parody that could not reasonably be understood as describ-
ing "actual facts" about the public figure involved); Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475
U.S. 767, 777 (1986) (holding unconstitutional the common-law presumption that defamatory
speech is false); Old Dominion Branch No. 496, Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S.
264, 284-86 (1974) (ruling that an accusation that an individual was a "traitor" for acting as a union
"scab" was not a basis for a defamation action because the word "traitor" was used in a "loose,
figurative sense" and was "merely rhetorical hyperbole, a lusty and imaginative expression of the
contempt felt by union members"); Greenbelt Coop. Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 14
(1970) (rejecting the contention that a local newspaper's use of word "blackmail" describing a real
estate developer's position implied that the developer actually committed the crime of blackmail).
10. See Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2709 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (The majority employs "the same
indicia that lower courts have been relying on for the past decade or so to distinguish between
statements of fact and statements of opinion: the type of language used, the meaning of the state-
ment in context, whether the statement is verifiable, and the broader social circumstances in which
the statement was made.") (citations omitted).
11. Id. at 2707.
12. See id. at 2706 ("[W]e think that the 'breathing space' which 'freedoms of expression re-
quire in order to survive' is secured by existing constitutional doctine .... ") (citation omitted).
13. See id.
14. Id.
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doctrine requires an inquiry into the implied factual content of a
statement.15
The Court's inquiry, limited as it is to implied and direct factual
content, is not an "erosion," 16 but rather an affirmation of the Court's
previous holdings regarding libel. Foremost, the Milkovich Court stated
that for media defendants, Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps17 re-
quires that statements on matters of public concern "must be provable as
false before there can be liability under state defamation law."18 Addi-
tionally, the Milkovich Court held that Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing
Ass'n v. Bresler,1 9 Old Dominion Branch No. 496, National Ass'n of Letter
Carriers v. Austin,20 and Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell21 "provide
protection for statements that cannot 'reasonably [be] interpreted as stat-
ing actual facts' about an individual."'22
In applying this existing constitutional doctrine to the newspaper
column under examination in Milkovich, the Court applied three criteria.
First, whether the statement contained "the sort of loose, figurative or
hyperbolic language which would negate the impression that the writer
was seriously maintaining" the alleged factual assertion. 23 Second,
whether "the general tenor of the article negate[s] this impression." 24 Fi-
nally, whether the assertion is "sufficiently factual to be susceptible of
being proved true or false."' 25 In other words, the question is whether
tenor, context, and provability indicate that a statement asserts a "fact."
As others have already noted, although perhaps without sufficient
explanation,26 this articulation of the constitutional opinion privilege dif-
fers only in semantics from the pre-Milkovich opinion privilege, as com-
monly applied. 27 In substance, the privilege remains identical. Concerns
15. See id.
16. See Stem, supra note 3.
17. 475 U.S. 767 (1986).
18. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2706.
19. 398 U.S. 6 (1970).
20. 418 U.S. 264 (1974).
21. 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
22. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2706 (quoting Falwell, 485 U.S. at 50). For an excellent overview
of libel law, see LucAs A. PowE, THE FOURTH ESTATE AND THE CONSTITUTION: FREEDOM OF
THE PRESS IN AMERICA (1991).
23. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2707.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 1989 Term-Leading Caser, 104 HARV. L. REv. 219, 223
(1990) ("The standard articulated by the Milkovich Court for determining when a statement is an
actionable assertion of fact is essentially the same as that the lower courts have used for years to
distinguish between fact and opinion.").
27. See infra text accompanying notes 93-104.
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that the opinion privilege has been "disposed" of,28 or that the decision
signals an "ominous" tilting toward the finding of actionable state-
ments,29 are unwarranted from the Milkovich opinion itself.30 For
although the newspaper sports column at issue in Milkovich is full of the
sort of opinion statements previously understood to be exempt from libel
actions,31 in the end, all the Milkovich Court does is apply its "new"
articulation of the opinion privilege to the column's factual content, leav-
ing undisturbed all of the column's "pure" opinion content. 32 In short,
the Court maintained the status quo. It held that assertions of fact,
whether implied or directly stated, if false and defamatory, may be the
subject of a libel suit.33
Why, then, the confusion and concern found in law review articles34
and the profound misapplication of Milkovich found in at least one re-
cent state supreme court case?35 I submit the following: Read without
close attention to Chief Justice Rehnquist's explicit instruction as to how
the passage in question is to be tested for the truth of its factual content,
the application of the Milkovich test might seem to indicate that the col-
umn's "pure" opinion statements are potentially defamatory.3 6 Yet such
28. See Hager, supra note 3, at 952.
29. See Stern, supra note 3, at 595.
30. Of course, too much concern may itself be cause for concern if lower courts are misled into
believing that the constitutional opinion privilege has been weakened. See, e.g., Spence v. Flynt, 816
P.2d 771 (Wyo. 1991), discussed infra text accompanying notes 159-73. I do not mean to imply that
lower courts, in general, have been misapplying Milkovich. Examples of published opinions that
correctly apply Milkovich include Foretich v. Glamour, 753 F. Supp. 955, 966 (D.D.C. 1990) ("The
ultimate fact must then be such that plaintiff can prove its falsity; thus some generalized opinions or
'rhetorical hyperbole' often found in the media are privileged even though they may be said to place
a person in an unfair or unfavorable light.") and Don King Prods., Inc. v. Douglas, 742 F. Supp.
778, 781-85 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding that remarks by a boxing promoter, to the effect that Mike
Tyson should have been declared the winner of a match with the boxer Buster Douglas, were pro-
tected opinions under Milkovich).
31. See infra text accompanying notes 74-86.
32. See Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2706-07. The term "pure" opinion is not that of the Supreme
Court, but is borrowed from the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 (1977). The Milkovich
Court probably avoids the term "pure" opinion because it does not fully convey that an implied
statement of fact underlying an opinion statement may still be considered libelous. Used in this
Note, the term "pure" opinion is not intended to encompass those statements of opinion that, in
context, imply potentially libelous facts. Rather, the term "pure" opinion is used because it provides
a convenient shorthand form to describe the category of statements identified by Milkovich as not
sufficiently factual to be reasonably labeled "true" or "false."
33. See Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2706-07.
34. See supra note 3.
35. See Spence v. Flynt, 816 P.2d 771 (Wyo. 1991), discussed infra text accompanying notes
159-73.
36. See infra text accompanying notes 117-20.
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an inclusion of "pure" opinion would make the Milkovich test "incoher-
ent"37 because it is an application that is unintended by the Court and for
which the Milkovich test is ill suited. If Milkovich were read to invite
scrutiny into "pure" opinions (such as many of those in the sports col-
umn), then the change in libel law would be radical and unsettling, as
some have suggested. 38
But if the Court had intended to eliminate constitutional protection
for opinion, it would not have devoted energy to distinguishing state-
ments that do garner constitutional protection from those that do not. 39
Indeed, deciding when a statement is "pure" opinion (that is, a statement
identified by Milkovich as having the characteristics that require protec-
tion by the Constitution; in other words-not reasonably subject to being
found "true" or "false" by a jury), and when it is something else, is the
central problem of Milkovich.
The sports column at question in Milkovich provides a good forum
to explore this problem because it contains statements of both "pure"
and "couched" opinion. 40 Most of the statements of "pure" opinion in
the Milkovich column relate to the actions of high school wrestling coach
Michael Milkovich at a team meet. For example, the column states that
"Milkovich's ranting from the side of the mat and egging the crowd on
against the meet official and the opposing team backfired... and resulted
in... a brawl .... - 41 Because the "fact" that the coach made gestures
37. See D'Amato, supra note 3, at 343 n.56.
38. See, eg., Hager, supra note 3, at 952.
39. See Milkovich, 110 S. CL at 2705-06.
40. For instance, the statement "that painting is ugly" is "pure" opinion. I do not mean to
suggest that in linguistic terms a statement can be rigorously characterized as "opinion" or "fact."
Even the statement "that painting is ugly" operates on more than one level. It asserts, in an "opin-
ion," the speaker's evaluation of the painting's aesthetic worth. But it also asserts, as "fact," that the
painting exists. One might imagine a scenario where the mere assertion of the painting's existence
could be defamatory and, thus, even this statement of "pure" opinion could be the subject of a libel
aision. In no circumstance, however, could a jury reasonably decide the "truth" of the speaker's
characterization of the painting as "ugly." This is because some words and statements are subject to
interpretative variance too wide for a jury to decide reasonably that one interpretation is "true" and
another "false." See discussion infra text accompanying notes 130-34.
By contrast, the statement, "in my opinion, Jack robbed the bank at the cormer of Main and
Spring Streets" conveys a factual assertion, albeit an assertion "couched" in the terms of opinion.
This "factual" assertion is reasonably subject to being found "true" or "false" by a jury. But, just as
I do not wish to suggest that statements of "pure" opinion are devoid of "fact" content, I also do not
wish to suggest that statements of "fact" are devoid of a range of interpretation similar to statements
of "opinion." For example, depending on context, the word "robbed" might mean "held up the
bank teller at gun point," or the word "robbed" might mean "cleverly took advantage of the bank's
unusually high interest rates by opening an account." However, by "facts," I mean those statements
that in context have a suitably narrow range of reasonable interpretation such that juries can decide
if the meaning conveyed by the statement corresponds as "true" or "false" to a state of events.
41. Ted Diadiun, Maple Beat the Law with the "Big Lie," THE NEws-HERALD (Willoughby,
Ohio), Jan. 8, 1975, at 39, quoted in Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2698-99 n.2.
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and said words at the meet, and that there was a fight, was not disputed
by Milkovich, 42 the statement's remaining meaning concerns the charac-
terization of the words and gestures, and the question of whether the
words and gestures aroused violence in the crowd. These later "opin-
ions" are subject to such wide interpretation that a jury could not reason-
ably decide if they are "true" or "false." 43
By contrast, the column also contains "couched" opinion. For ex-
ample, it states that before attending a court hearing, Milkovich and the
school superintendent "apparently had their version of the incident pol-
ished and reconstructed" from the time of an earlier hearing.44 The
word "apparently" functions in this sentence similarly to the words "in
my opinion." Without the word "apparently," the sentence would be a
direct statement of "fact" indicating that the men, in some manner, had
changed their story. This indication of change is reasonably subject to
being found "true" or "false" by a jury.45 When reviewed as part of the
entire column, the statement's tenor, context, and provability indicate
that the accusation of a change in testimony can be regarded as "fact." '46
The precise method that the Milkovich Court specifies for ascertain-
ing whether defamation occurred indicates that a distinction between
"pure" opinion and "couched" opinion remains in the law, and that only
the latter may properly be subject to a libel suit. More specifically, the
Court states that the alleged defamation is to be established "on a core of
objective evidence by comparing" the testimony at the two hearings
stemming from the fight.4 7 Such a comparison would reveal whether
there was a change in Milkovich's testimony from the first to the second
hearing. This alleged change in testimony is the subject of the "couched"
opinion sentence, quoted above.48 Comparing the two testimony records
would not reveal whether Milkovich encouraged the altercation-
whether the testimony between the two hearings is the same or different
says nothing about the cause of the altercation. The cause of the alterca-
tion is the subject of the "pure" opinion sentence, quoted above.49
42. See Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2713 n.9 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
43. See infra text accompanying notes 130-34.
44. Diadiun, supra note 41, at 39 (emphasis added).
45. The words "polish" and "reconstruct" are also capable of interpretation. But regardless of
whether reasonable jurors would agree on the exact degree of change implied, at a minimum the
words imply that some alteration occurred. Testing the proposition that testimony was altered is a
relatively objective task. Trial transcripts could be compared for consistency without jurors having
to agree on an exact definition of "polish" or "reconstruct."
46. See infra text accompanying notes 123-25.
47. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2707.
48. See supra text accompanying note 44.
49. See supra text accompanying note 41.
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My primary purpose in this Note is to show that Milkovich did not
change libel law to include statements of "pure" opinion as potentially
defamatory. My secondary purpose is to explore a more subtle issue sug-
gested by the confusion over Milkovich: whether and when statements
that can reasonably be interpreted as conveying either opinion or fact
should be subject to libel suit. Specifically, in Part One I review the facts
and law relevant to the Milkovich case and conclude with a discussion of
why statements with especially wide variance in potential meaning-
such as "beautiful" and "ugly"-cannot reasonably be labeled "true" or
"false," the core Milkovich requirement for holding that a statement is
potentially defamatory. In Part Two I review and critique two law re-
view treatments and a recent state supreme court decision relying on
Milkovich. Finally, in Part Three I discuss the complex problem of how
to address statements that can be reasonably read in a libelous or non-
libelous manner.
I. MLKOViCH: ITS FACTS, HOLDING, AND APPLICATION
A. Factual Background
The Milkovich case stems from events at a high school wrestling
match in Maple Heights, Ohio. During a match between the Maple
Heights team and rival Mentor High School, a fight broke out, leading to
an investigation by the Ohio High School Athletic Association
(OHSAA). Both Michael Milkovich (the coach) and H. Don Scott (the
superintendent of Maple Heights Public Schools) testified at the hearing
held by OHSAA. As a result of the investigation, OHSAA censured
Milkovich for his role in the altercation. In addition, the Maple Heights
team was placed on probation for a year and disqualified from the 1975
state wrestling tournament.50
In an attempt to restrain the OHSAA order from taking effect, sev-
eral parents and wrestlers brought suit against OHSAA in the Court of
Common Pleas of Franklin County, Ohio; they alleged that the OHSAA
hearing failed to provide them with adequate due process. Following
testimony by Milkovich and Scott, the court agreed, and ordered that the
OHSAA ruling not be put into effect.51
The next day, Ted Diadiun, a local sports columnist, published an
article that severely criticized Milkovich and Scott.5 2 Diadiun, who at-
tended the wrestling meet and the OHSAA hearing, accused Milkovich
50. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2698.
51. Id.
52. The full text of the column is as follows:
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of lying about his role in the altercation. Although Milkovich main-
tained that he was powerless to control the crowd and that he did noth-
ing to encourage the fight, Diadiun said that Milkovich was "ranting"
Yesterday in the Franklin County Common Pleas Court, judge Paul Martin over-
turned an Ohio High School Athletic Assn. decision to suspend the Maple Heights wres-
tling team from this year's state tournament.
It's not final yet-the judge granted Maple only a temporary injunction against the
ruling-but unless the judge acts much more quickly than he did in this decision (he has
been deliberating since a Nov. 8 hearing) the temporary injunction will allow Maple to
compete in the tournament and make any further discussion meaningless.
But there is something much more important involved here than whether Maple was
denied due process by the OHSAA, the basis of the temporary injunction.
When a person takes on a job in a school, whether it be as a teacher, coach, adminis-
trator or even maintenance worker, it is well to remember that his primary job is that of
educator.
There is scarcely a person concerned with school who doesn't leave his mark in some
way on the young people who pass his way-many are the lessons taken away from school
by students which weren't learned from a lesson plan or out of a book. They come from
personal experiences with and observations of their superiors and peers, from watching
actions and reactions.
Such a lesson was learned (or relearned) yesterday by the student body of Maple
Heights High School, and by anyone who attended the Maple-Mentor wrestling meet of
last Feb. 8.
A lesson, which, sadly, in view of the events of the past year, is well they learned early.
It is simply this: If you get in a jam, lie your way out.
If you're successful enough, and powerful enough, and can sound sincere enough, you
stand an excellent chance of making the lie stand up, regardless of what really happened.
The teachers responsible were mainly head Maple wrestling coach Mike Milkovich
and former superintendent of schools H. Donald Scott.
Last winter they were faced with a difficult situation. Milkovich's ranting from the
side of the mat and egging the crowd on against the meet official and the opposing team
backfired during a meet with Greater Cleveland Conference rival Metor [sic], and resulted
in first the Maple Heights team, then many of the partisan crowd attacking the Mentor
squad in a brawl which sent four Mentor wrestlers to the hospital.
Naturally, when Mentor protested to the governing body of high school sports, the
OHSAA, the two men were called on the carpet to account for the incident.
But they declined to walk into the hearing and face up to their responsibilities, as one
would hope a coach of Milkovich's accomplishments and reputation would do, and one
would certainly expect from a man with the responsible poisition [sic] of superintendent of
schools.
Instead they chose to come to the hearing and misrepresent the thing that happened to
the OHSAA Board of Control, attempting not only to convince the board of their own
innocence, but, incredibly, shift the blame of the affair to Mentor.
I was among the 2,000-plus witnesses of the meet at which the trouble broke out, and
I also attended the hearing before the OHSAA, so I was in a unique position of being the
only non-involved party to observe both the meet itself and the Milkovich-Scott version
presented to the board.
Any resemblance between the two occurrances [sic] is purely coincidental.
To anyone who was at the meet, it need only be said that the Maple coach's wild
gestures during the events leading up to the brawl were passed off by the two as "shrugs,"
and that Milkovich claimed he was "Powerless to control the crowd" before the melee.
Fortunately, it seemed at the time, the Milkovich-Scott version of the incident
presented to the board of control had enough contradictions and obvious untruths so that
the six board members were able to see through it.
Probably as much in distasteful reaction to the chicanery of the two officials as in
displeasure over the actual incident, the board then voted to suspend Maple from this
year's tournament and to put Maple Heights, and both Milkovich and his son, Mike Jr.
(the Maple Jaycee coach), on two-year probation.
But unfortunately, by the time the hearing before Judge Main rolled around,
Milkovich and Scott apparently had their version of the incident polished and recon-
structed, and the judge apparently believed them.
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from the sidelines and "egging on" the crowd. Diadiun also said that
Milkovich and Scott "polished and reconstructed" their stories about the
incident prior to testifying before the Court of Common Pleas,53 and
quoted the OHSAA commissioner as saying that the two men's accounts
given before the court differed from those given to the OHSAA board.5 4
The headline to the column read: "Maple Beat the Law with the 'Big
Lie.'" Diadiun's photograph appeared below the headline with the
words "TD Says." The headline on the jump page to the column said
"Diadiun Says Maple Told a Lie.""5
Both Milkovich and Scott filed defamation suits against Diadiun
and the newspaper's owner, the Lorain Journal Company. 56 Milkovich's
action, brought in the Court of Common Pleas of Lake County, Ohio,
alleged that the headline of the column and nine passages within it "ac-
cused plaintiff of committing the crime of perjury, an indictable offense in
the State of Ohio, and damaged plaintiff directly in his life-time occupa-
tion of coach and teacher, and constituted libel per se."57
A series of court maneuvers ensued. Eventually, in Scott's case, the
Ohio Supreme Court held that the challenged passages in Diadiun's arti-
cle were "constitutionally protected opinion."58 The Ohio courts held
that this decision also determined the result in the Milkovich case.59 The
U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider "the Ohio courts' rec-
ognition of a constitutionally-required 'opinion' exception to the applica-
tion of its defamation laws."' 6°
"I can say that some of the stories told to the judge sounded pretty darned unfamil-
iar," said Dr. Harold Meyer, commissioner of the OHSAA, who attended the hearing. "It
certainly sounded different from what they told us."
Nevertheless, the judge bought their story, and ruled in their favor.
Anyone who attended the meet, whether he be from Maple Heights, Mentor, or im.-
partial observer, knows in his heart the Milkovich and Scott lied at the hearing after each
having given his solemn oath to tell the truth.
But they got away with it.
Is that the kind of lesson we want our young people learning from their high school
administrators and coaches?
I think not.
Diadiun, supra note 41, at 35, 39, quoted in Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2698 n.2.
53. Id
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2699-700.
57. Id. at 2700.
58. Scott v. News-Herald, 496 N.E.2d 699, 709 (Ohio 1986).
59. See Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2701.
60. Id
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B. The Opinion on Opinion: The Supreme Court's Holding
Chief Justice Rehnquist devotes the bulk of the Milkovich opinion to
reviewing the development of libel law and related constitutional doc-
trine. The opinion begins with a reminder that a common law tort for
written defamation has been available since the sixteenth century.61
Although the common law required that a publication be false and de-
famatory to state a cause of action, statements of opinion, if sufficiently
damaging to injure reputation, were still deemed to be actionable.62
Eventually, to protect public debate, the principle of "fair comment" was
adopted into the common law. Fair comment exempted from the tort of
defamation expressions of opinion regarding matters of public concern
and based upon "true" facts.63
As Milkovich notes, the Supreme Court injected dramatic change
into the common law of libel with its decision in New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan." New York Times held that the First Amendment served to
restrict state defamation law. Namely, public officials could not recover
for defamatory falsehoods regarding the official's public activity absent a
showing of "actual malice"-reckless disregard of whether the statement
was false or not.65 Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts66 extended New York
Times to include all public figures.67 Later, in Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc. ,68 the Court held that malice must be shown by clear and convincing
proof.69 Although this standard was held not to control private individu-
als who allege defamation related to a statement of public concern, 70 the
Court did rule that in this circumstance the states must require a show-
ing of fault, and no punitive or presumed damages could be awarded
absent a showing of actual malice.71
In reaching its decision in Gertz, the Court, in dictum, briefly
touched on the issue of opinion: "Under the First Amendment there is
no such thing as a false idea. However pernicious an opinion may seem,
we depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries
61. Id at 2702.
62. Id. at 2702-03 (quoting REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 cnt. a (1977)).
63. Id at 2703.
64. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
65. Id at 279-80.
66. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
67. See id. at 155.
68. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
69. See id. at 343.
70. See id. at 351.
71. See id. at 350.
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but on the competition of ideas. But there is no constitutional value in
false statements of fact."'72
Ultimately, in Milkovich, the Court held that although this dictum
did not create a separate "wholesale" constitutional privilege for any-
thing that might be labeled opinion, at the same time several other
Supreme Court rulings, taken together, were found already to secure
constitutional protection for opinion.73 For example, in Philadelphia
Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps,74 the Court held unconstitutional the common
law presumption that defamatory speech is false-at least where a media
defendant publishing speech of public concern is involved. 75 Hepps re-
quired the plaintiff to bear the burden of showing falsity, as well as
fault.76 Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler77 held that the
First Amendment prohibits state defamation law from reaching certain
types of speech. 78 In Bresler, a newspaper article quoted individuals who
characterized a real estate developer's negotiating position as "black-
mail."' 79 Because the article stated the underlying facts of the negotiation
accurately and fully, the Court reasoned that the word "blackmail" was
intended as "rhetorical hyperbole, a vigorous epithet used by those who
considered [the developer's] negotiating position extremely unreasona-
ble." 80 The Court held that the article did not imply that the developer
committed the actual crime of blackmail.8 1 Similarly, in Hustler Maga-
zine, Inc. v. Falwell,82 the Court held that a vulgar advertisement parody
was protected by the First Amendment as satire because the parody
"could not reasonably have been interpreted as stating actual facts about
the public figure involved. ' ' 83 And in Old Dominion Branch No. 496,
National Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 84 the Court held that an accu-
sation that an individual was a "traitor" due to his activity as a union
"scab" was protected speech. 85 The Court said that the term "traitor"
72. Id. at 339-40 (footnote omitted).
73. See Milkovich, 110 S. CL at 2705-06.
74. 475 U.S. 767 (1986).
75. See id. at 777.
76. See id at 776.
77. 398 U.S. 6 (1970).
78. See id at 14.
79. See id. at 13.
80. Id. at 14.,
81. See id
82. 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
83. Id. at 50.
84. 418 U.S. 264 (1984).
85. See id. at 284-86.
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was, in context, used in a "loose, figurative sense," and not to be taken
literally.8 6
Thus, although the Milkovich Court explicitly declined to recognize
a separate constitutional privilege for opinion, 87 under existing consti-
tutional doctrine (including the Bresler-Letter Carriers-Falwell line of
cases) the Court reaffirmed protection of "statements that cannot 'rea-
sonably [be] interpreted as stating actual facts' about an individual. ' 88
Prior to Milkovich an initial inquiry in a libel suit was whether the
challenged utterances were fact or opinion. Facts, if false and defama-
tory, were potentially libelous, while opinions were protected by the First
Amendment. 89 Milkovich recognized that fact and opinion may overlap
and thus requires that courts ask whether a reasonable factfinder could
conclude that the expression in question implies an objective assertion of
fact.90 If so, even phrases couched in the language of opinion may be
libelous.91
But although the formulation of the required inquiry changed, the
Court left the underlying principle of the opinion privilege intact: Only
assertions that "contain a provable false factual connotation" are poten-
tially libelous.92 Even the method the Court delineated for deciding
when a statement is sufficiently concrete and definable to warrant an ac-
tion did not change, except in semantics, from its previous incarnations
in lower courts.
As discussed earlier, the Milkovich Court's "new" method employed
three criteria in analyzing the challenged statements in the Diadiun col-
umn.93 First, whether the statements contained "the sort of loose, figura-
tive or hyperbolic language which would negate the impression that the
writer was seriously maintaining" the alleged factual assertion.94 Sec-
ond, whether "the general tenor of the article negate[s] this impres-
sion." 95 Finally, whether the assertion is "sufficiently factual to be
86. See id. at 284.
87. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2707 (1990).
88. Id (quoting Falwell, 485 U.S. at 50).
89. See, eg., Potomac Valve & Fitting, Inc. v. Crawford Fitting Co., 829 F.2d 1280 (4th Cir.
1987); Janklow v. Newsweek, Inc., 788 F.2d 1300 (8th Cir. 1986); Olman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970
(D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985).
90. See Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2705-06.
91. See id. at 2706.
92. Id
93. See supra text accompanying notes 23-25.
94. Id. at 2707.
95. Id
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susceptible of being proved true or false."' 96 In sum, the Court recog-
nized that the context, tenor, and provability of a statement must be ex-
amined to understand its reasonable interpretation.
The constitutional opinion privilege previously delineated by lower
courts used the same inquiry. For instance, the test as formulated in
Olman v Evans 97 by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit (which was relied on by the Ohio Supreme Court in analyzing
Diadiun's column 98) states that four factors are relevant in determining if
a statement is constitutionally protected opinion: (1) the specific lan-
guage used; (2) whether the statement is verifiable; (3) the general con-
text of the statement; and (4) the broader context in which the statements
appeared.99 The Milkovich Court specifically held that the Olman court
was mistaken in asserting that the Gertz dictum required a "wholesale"
separate constitutional protection for "anything that might be labeled
'opinion.' "1o But it should be apparent by even a surface comparison of
the Olman and Milkovich tests that both employ identical factors: con-
text, tenor, and the provability of factual content. The first Olman fac-
tor-examining the specific language used-is equivalent in meaning to
examining tenor. The third and fourth Olman factors are explicitly con-
cerned with context. And the second Olman factor-verifiability-is
the same as provability. To restate the comparison: The Milkovich
method of excluding from libel protection ostensible opinion statements
containing "implied objective fact" is identical to the Olman analysis
distinguishing protected "opinion" from unprotected fact.
Two other widely used articulations of the opinion privilege are
founded on common law protections of opinion, and not on the constitu-
tional protection of opinion discussed in Olman. Nonetheless, the tests
are, like Olman, strikingly similar to Milkovich. The totality-of-circum-
stances test, as articulated by the Court of Appeals for Ninth Circuit in
Information Control Corp. v. Genesis One Computer Corp. ,10o1 calls for a
consideration of "the statement in its totality in the context in which it
96. Id. Chief Justice Rehnquist applies these three criteria, in a distilled form, not only in
analyzing the allegedly libelous newspaper column, but also in analyzing the Court's own well-
known dictum on opinion in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974). Rehnquist
rejects the view that the dictum creates a "wholesale defamation exemption" as being "contrary to
the tenor and context of the passage" and as ignoring "the fact that expressions of 'opinion' may
often imply an assertion of objective fact." Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2705. This analysis of context,
tenor, and the presence of provable factual content is identical to the three-step inquiry later applied
in Milkovich.
97. 750 F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985).
98. See Scott v. News-Herald, 496 N.E.2d 699, 709 (Ohio 1986).
99. Oilman, 750 F.2d at 979.
100. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2705.
101. 611 F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 1980).
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was uttered or published" to determine if the statement is protected opin-
ion or unprotected fact under California law.10 2 Furthermore, tenor is to
be considered; as the court put it, "cautionary terms used by the person
publishing the statement."' 0 3
The test set forth by the Restatement (Second) of Torts makes the
same distinction as Milkovich between protected opinion and opinion
that implies fact: "A defamatory communication may consist of a state-
ment in the form of an opinion, but a statement of this nature is actiona-
ble only if it implies the allegation of undisclosed defamatory facts as the
basis for the opinion."' 4
Neither of the above non-constitutional protections of opinion state-
ments is in any way abridged by Milkovich's requirement that only
"provably false factual connotation[s]" may be libelous as determined by
considering the context, tenor, and the provability of a statement. 0 5 In
fact, it may be that the Restatement approach does not provide sufficient
constitutional protection for opinion in light of Milkovich. If the implied
"undisclosed" defamatory fact contemplated by the Restatement cannot
"reasonably [be] interpreted as stating actual facts"' 0 6 about an individ-
ual, as opposed to speculative "undisclosed" facts, then the Restatement
approach fails to provide the constitutional protection Milkovich re-
quires. Far from restricting the opinion privilege, Milkovich might ulti-
mately force the enlargement of the Restatement approach.
What the Supreme Court rejected in Milkovich was an entirely sepa-
rate constitutional privilege for any statement couched in the language of
opinion. Gertz was not intended "to create a wholesale defamation ex-
emption for anything that might be labeled 'opinion.' "107 But, as the
above examples of the "old" opinion standard illustrate, the pre-
Milkovich opinion privilege never created such a wholesale exemption.
Milkovich removed nothing from existing doctrine by refusing to find
content in the Gertz dictum.
Chief Justice Rehnquist used the following as an illustration of the
implied fact/protected opinion distinction: "[U]nlike the statement 'In
my opinion Mayor Jones is a liar,' the.statement, 'In my opinion Mayor
Jones shows his abysmal ignorance by accepting the teachings of Marx
and Lenin,' would not be actionable."'' 0 8 Presumably, the first example is
102. See id. at 784.
103. Id.
104. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 (1977).
105. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2706.
106. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988)).
107. Id. at 2705.
108. Id.
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one of "couched" opinion, focusing on the telling of truths or untruths,
as might be determined in a court action for perjury. The second exam-
ple is one of "pure" opinion, focusing on the phrase "abysmal igno-
rance," presumably because a plaintiff could not "prove" if by accepting
Marx and Lenin the plaintiff showed ignorance or enlightenment.
This particular hypothetical, however, is only helpful to a point, as
varying contexts for the statements could be imagined so as to give the
hypothetical opposing interpretations. For example, if the statement
"Mayor Jones said he never stole from the public treasury" precedes the
sentence "In my opinion, Mayor Jones is a liar," then the interpretative
focus imagined by the Chief Justice is clear: One would ask if there is a
factual basis for the speaker's assertion that the Mayor stole, despite the
"couching" of the accusation in terms of opinion. But if the statement
"Mayor Jones says he no longer accepts the teachings of Marx" precedes
the sentence "In my opinion, Mayor Jones is a liar," then the hypotheti-
cal is turned on its end. The speaker in this second example is asserting
that Mayor Jones still accepts the teachings of Marx, despite his state-
ment to the contrary. Read this way, Mayor Jones is a "liar" because he
says he does not accept what he really does accept, and the speaker's
comment is an assertion of his opinion about the mayor's beliefs. The
speaker might assert, for example, that the Mayor's support for public
health care proves that the Mayor is really still a Marxist. The Mayor
might assert that he abandoned Marxism years ago, and his support for
public health care just makes him a liberal. Neither the speaker nor the
Mayor could prove the falsity of this alleged "lie," although the hypo-
thetical, because it is not grounded in context, might be misread to imply
otherwise.
C. Which Lie? Applying the Law to the Facts
To get a firmer grasp of the Court's intended use of the Milkovich
test, one should pay particular attention to the Chief Justices's specific
instructions as to how, on remand, the Ohio court should test Diadiun's
statement. The crucial question in understanding the specific instruction
is: What lie is being referred to when the Court says Diadiun's accusa-
tion of a "lie" told by Milkovich is actionable? Although the column
discusses two distinct "lies," the Court's specific instruction in testing the
statement shows that the Court only intended to hold one of these ac-
cused "lies" as potentially actionable. The first, more obvious "lie" is
Diadiun's rejection of Milkovich's characterization of Milkovich's behav-
ior during the altercation. This is the question of whether Milkovich
"shrugged" or "ranted," whether he was "powerless" to control the
crowd, or whether he was "egging on" the crowd. The second "lie"
VCol. 41:415]
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Milkovich is accused of telling is his alleged change in testimony from
the first to the second hearing. Chief Justice Rehnquist's specific instruc-
tions to test the alleged defamation by comparing the two hearing tran-
scripts'0 9 demonstrates that only this second alleged "lie" is to be
considered as a potentially actionable statement. To gain a better under-
standing of why only the second "lie" is held actionable, it is necessary to
examine the Diadiun column in fuller context.
On the night of the altercation, in front of a crowd of fans, it is
undisputed that Michael Milkovich served as the wrestling coach to Ma-
ple Heights.110 It is also undisputed that during the match Milkovich
made statements and gestures that were audible and visible to the
crowd." ' But the nature of the remarks, and any effect the remarks
might have had in inciting the altercation, are very much in dispute.
In his column, Diadiun described the events at the meet, which he
attended, as follows: "Milkovich's ranting from the side of the mat and
egging the crowd on against the meet official and the opposing team
backfired during a meet with Greater Cleveland Conference rival Metor
(sic), and resulted in first the Maple Heights team, then many of the
partisan crowd attacking the Mentor squad in a brawl which sent four
Mentor wrestlers to the hospital."" 2 That Milkovich and Scott vehe-
mently disagreed with Diadiun's assessment of the incident is made clear
by Diadiun's column itself: "the Maple coach's wild gestures during the
events leading up to the brawl were passed off by the two as 'shrugs,' and
that Milkovich claimed he was '[p]owerless to control the crowd' before
the melee."" 3 Diadiun continued: "Fortunately, it seemed at the time,
the Milkovich-Scott version presented to the [OHSAA] board of control
had enough contradictions and obvious untruths so that the six board
members were able to see through it."" 4
Diadiun's first accusation against Milkovich and Scott is that they
misrepresented the events at the match to the OHSAA board: "Instead
they chose to come to the hearing and misrepresent the things that hap-
pened to the OHSAA Board of Control, attempting not only to convince
the board of their own innocence, but, incredibly, shift the blame of the
affair to Mentor." 1 5
109. See id. at 2707.
110. Id. at 2698.
111. See id.
112. See Diadiun, supra note 41, at 39.
113. Id.
114. Id
115. IdL
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However, the above passage was not listed in Milkovich's libel suit
as defamatory. Instead, Milkovich identified the headline and the follow-
ing nine passages from the column as defamatory:
[A] lesson was learned (or relearned) yesterday by the student body of
Maple Heights High School, and by anyone who attended the Maple-
Mentor wrestling meet of last Feb. 8.
A lesson which, sadly, in view of the events of the past year, is
well they learned early.
It is simply this: If you get in a jam, lie your way out.
If you're successful enough, and powerful enough, and can sound
sincere enough, you stand an excellent chance of making the lie stand
up, regardless of what really happened.
The teachers responsible were mainly head Maple wrestling coach
Mike Milkovich and former superintendent of schools H. Donald
Scott.
Anyone who attended the meet, whether he be from Maple
Heights, Mentor, or impartial observer, knows in his heart that
Milkovich and Scott lied at the hearing after each having given his
solemn oath to tell the truth.
But they got away with it. Is that the kind of lesson we want our
young people learning from their high school administrators and
coaches?
I think not.1 16
Not clear from any of the alleged defamatory statements quoted
above is the exact content of the "lie." Because truth i an absolute de-
fense in a libel suit,1 17 if Milkovich really did lie in court, no legal action
would be possible, regardless of the damage to his reputation. As funda-
mental a question as "what was the lie" might seem to the disposition of
the case, Chief Justice Rehnquist never answers it directly. However, the
intended content of the "lie" is made plain by Rehnquist's specified
method for testing the "lie." Toward the conclusion of the majority
opinion, Rehnquist states that "[a] determination of whether petitioner
lied in this instance can be made on a core of objective evidence by com-
paring, inter alia,-petitioner's testimony before the OHSAA board with
his subsequent testimony before the trial court.""" This specified
method narrowly focuses on the change in testimony that Diadiun al-
leges took place before the Court of Common Pleas.
116. Id.
117. See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776 (1986) (fashioning "a con-
stitutional requirement that the plaintiff bear the burden of showing falsity, as well as fault, before
recovering damages" against a media defendant for speech of public concern).
118. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2707.
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The other possible interpretation of the alleged "lie" is a reference to
Milkovich's characterization of the fight. This interpretation is ration-
ally based on the language of the column. Recall that one of the passages
Milkovich identified as defamatory said that "[a]nyone who attended the
meet, whether he be from Maple Heights, Mentor, or impartial observer,
knows in his heart that Milkovich and Scott lied at the [Court of Com-
mon Pleas] hearing after each having given his solemn oath to tell the
truth." 119 One understanding of the sentence is that "anyone" at the
match saw and heard what happened; at the Court of Common Pleas
hearing, Milkovich and Scott described the events in a way that Diadiun
believed "anyone" at the match would find inconsistent with what actu-
ally happened. Namely, Diadiun believed that Milkovich encouraged the
fight, while Milkovich and Scott denied this. This "lie," then, is
Milkovich's statement that he did not encourage the altercation.
But considering the wide variance in meaning a reasonable juror
might give to the definition of enticing violence in a crowd of wrestling
fans, holding such a statement as potentially defamatory would seem to
violate Milkovich's maxim that only statements capable of being proven
true or false may be considered libelous. Indeed, requiring jurors or a
court to resolve such an issue as "fact" is wholly inconsistent with the
Court's specific instruction (to compare Milkovich's testimony from the
OHSAA hearing to the court hearing) regarding the ultimate resolution
of the Milkovich defamation action. How could comparing transcripts of
Milkovich's own testimony determine whether his characterization of
events at the wrestling match was accurate? After all, even if he wildly
lied in both instances, his own testimony would not be likely to reveal
anything but internal inconsistencies-hardly an "objective" evaluation
of what transpired at the match. This cannot be the inquiry the Court
calls for because it is not resolvable by a "core of objective evidence. ' 120
Instead, Chief Justice Rehnquist's analysis leads exclusively to a fo-
cus on the question of the change in testimony from the OHSAA hearing
to the court hearing. The paragraphs preceding and following the sen-
tence, "[a]nyone who attended the meet," put this focus into context.
But unfortunately, by the time the hearing before Judge Martin
rolled around, Milkovich and Scott apparently had their version of the
incident polished and reconstructed, and the judge apparently believed
them.
"I can say that some of the stories told to the judge sounded
pretty darned unfamiliar," said Dr. Harold Meyer, commissioner of
119. Diadiun, supra note 41, at 39 (emphasis added).
120. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2707.
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the OHSAA, who attended the hearing. "It certainly sounded differ-
ent from what they told us."
Nevertheless, the judge bought their story, and ruled in their
favor.
Anyone who attended the meet, whether he be from Maple
Heights, Mentor, or impartial observer, knows in his heart that
Milkovich and Scott lied at the hearing after each having given his
solemn oath to tell the truth.
But they got away with it.121
The only way the Court's test of comparing Milkovich's testimony
at the hearings is coherent is if the "lie" referred to is the "polishing and
reconstructing" of the stories. The Court must have this, and this "lie"
alone, in mind or it could not have stated so directly and concisely just
what the lower court was to do in assessing the alleged defamatory state-
ments: relying on a "core of objective evidence," compare Milkovich's
testimony at the two hearings. 122
It might be argued that the bulk of Diadiun's column does not focus
on this "lie." Diadiun demonstrates much more concern in the column
with Milkovich's characterization of his behavior at the wrestling match
than with Milkovich's alleged change in testimony. One should keep in
mind, however, that just because one potentially libelous statement or
implied fact in a column is among many others does not necessitate that
all of the statements or implied facts in the column be considered poten-
tially libelous. Making such a blanket assumption defies logic, and per-
haps more to the point, defies the explicit standard in Milkovich
requiring that for any statement to be considered libelous it must reason-
ably be provable as true or false. For this standard to function, each
allegedly libelous statement in an article, and each allegedly libelous im-
plied fact, must be examined separately.
Applying this statement-by-statement examination to the Diadiun
column reveals only a single challenged accusation that might be consid-
ered libelous. In his column, Diadiun states that "Milkovich and Scott
apparently had their version of the incident polished and recon-
structed." 123 The accusation is somewhat tempered by the use of the
word "apparently." However, without the word "apparently," the fac-
tual assertion of the sentence is direct: There was some change in testi-
mony from the first OHSAA hearing to the second court hearing. Thus,
the word "apparently" serves to "couch" the sentence in a term of opin-
ion. The "couched" accusation is supported by a quotation from Dr.
121. Diadiun, supra note 41, at 39.
122. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2707.
123. Diadiun, supra note 41, at 39 (emphasis added).
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Meyer, and is implicitly repeated, this time without the word "appar-
ently," in the following sentence, when Diadiun states that the judge
"bought their story." 124
The use of Dr. Meyer's quotation, the implicit repetition of the ac-
cusation in the following sentence, and Diadiun's immediate juxtaposi-
tion of the accusation against the charge of violating a solemn oath to tell
the truth, make plain that Diadiun presents his assertion without in-
tending the reader to question its veracity. The Court must be referring
to this assertion when it declines to afford Diadiun's column full consti-
tutional protection.
In his dissent, Justice Brennan disagrees that this assertion of a
change in testimony should be considered potentially libelous.' 25 Bren-
nan argues that the use of the "cautionary term 'apparently"' is an "un-
mistAable sign that Diadiun did not know what Milkovich had actually
said in court." 126 Justice Brennan also argues that because the piece is a
signed editorial with a photograph of the author, the reader is signaled
that the story is not to be taken as fact. And he asserts that the tone "is
point, exaggerated and heavily laden with emotional rhetoric and moral
outrage," thus negating the impression that the article is factual. 127
Whether or not one agrees with Justice Brennan about the signifi-
cance of the "couched" term "apparently," it is important to recognize
that the debate within the Milkovich Court does not extend to the "pure"
statements of opinion found in the Diadiun column. Nowhere does
Milkovich discuss sending to the jury questions regarding the characteri-
zation of the fight. The misunderstanding some commentators have
demonstrated to the contrary is explained by the structure of the Diadiun
column. Certain passages of the column vaguely make reference to a
"lie" without specifying the nature of the accusation.
For example, although the implied act of perjury128 recognized by
Chief Justice Rehnquist is the change in the story itself, the "lie" in the
124. Md
125. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2712 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
126. Id
127. Id
128. Diadiun never actually uses the word perjury in his column. He states "that Milkovich and
Scott lied at the hearing after each having given his solemn oath to tell the truth." Diadiun, supra
note 41, at 39. Of course, this accusation is very close to a charge of perjury. The term was used by
the petitioner in his complaint and accepted by Rehnquist without discussion of the possible distinc-
tion between it and lying. But there is a possible distinction, resting precisely on the contextual
difference between the use of the word "lie" as a term of dishonor and the use of the word as a term
with legal meaning.
In the context of Diadiun's exhortation of a "lesson" to be learned by high school students,
Diadiun is not so much concerned with (or even knowledgeable about) the legal requirements of
perjury as he is with the question of honor and doing the right thing-even if (or despite the fact
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alleged defamatory sentence beginning "[a]nyone who attended the
meet" also refers to Milkovich's general characterization of the meet. As
discussed earlier, the use of the phrase "[a]nyone who attended the meet"
implies that those familiar with events at the meet know that Milkovich's
characterization of his behavior was a "lie." 129 Those at the meet would
have no knowledge of Milkovich's alleged change in testimony. How-
ever, in context, the sentence follows directly from Diadiun's discussion
of the alleged alteration in testimony. The "lie," therefore, can also be
read to refer to the change in story. Milkovich teaches that the corre-
sponding "opinion" content of this sentence does not prevent the implied
"fact" content from being challenged. The presence of implied "fact"
content in the passage, however, does not indicate that the "pure" opin-
ion content of the statement may also be challenged.
Further complicating the matter is another challenged section of the
column referring to a "lie." This section is also as equally oriented to-
ward the description of the fight as it is to a comparison of the testimony
from the first to the second hearing. The section states: "If you're suc-
cessful enough, and powerful enough, and can sound sincere enough, you
stand an excellent chance of making the lie stand up, regardless of what
really happened." The immediately following paragraphs then turn to
the events of the altercation. The statement "what really happened"
might refer to the change in story from the first to the second hearing.
But another reading, given the immediate juxtaposition against a descrip-
tion of events at the meet, is a reference to "what really happened" at the
wrestling match. Despite the two possible interpretations, the Court
could not have meant to hold the latter interpretation out as potentially
defamatory because the Court's requirement of a "core of 'objective" evi-
dence would not allow for it.
The constitutional requirements reiterated by Milkovich allow for
only one possibility in analyzing the potential defamatory content of the
above ambiguous sentences: The implied "fact" content of the passages
that) no damaging legal consequences will result from doing the wrong thing. This is how Diadiun
closes his column: "Is that the kind of lesson we want our young people learning from their high
school administrators and coaches? I think not." Id This is not the tenor of a prosecutor seeking a
perjury indictment. Yet this is the standard to which Rehnquist assumes Diadiun should be held.
Instead, the Court should hold Diadiun to the standard he sets with his own words. Diadiun states
that Milkovich polished and reconstructed his story, and that this change constituted a violation of
Milkovich's oath to tell the truth. The factual question on remand should be whether the compari-
son of the transcripts reveals that Milkovich polished and reconstructed his story to a degree that
would lead a reasonable juror to believe that he violated his oath to tell the truth. Whether such a
reconstruction could actually lead to a conviction of pejury only clouds the issue. It should be
clear, however, that even Rehnquist's tacit assumption of a "pejury" accusation does not implicate
a "pure" statement of opinion as potentially defamatory.
129. See supra text accompanying note 119.
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may be scrutinized, but the "pure" opinion content must be left undis-
turbed. The presence of both types of content in a single passage should
not be understood to indicate that "pure" opinion assertions "lose" their
privilege. 130
D. The Beautiful and the Ugly. Why Different Words Require
Different Constitutional Protection
The Milkovich Court's focus on "a core of objective evidence"
makes it more straightforward for Michael Milkovich to prove his case.
He need only demonstrate that his testimony at the two hearings, as re-
corded by transcript, was not sufficiently different to justify Diadiun's
accusation that it constituted a "lie." But the Court's focus also makes it
easier for Diadiun to disprove Milkovich's case. Small but significant
changes in his testimony might be found reasonably to justify characteri-
zation of the testimony as a lie.
By contrast, if the court forced Milkovich to disprove Diadiun's ac-
count of the fight, then it would require the parties to enter into an un-
resolvable quagmire because of the linguistic difficulties associated with
confining the meaning of the phrases that Diadiun used to suggest
Milkovich encouraged the fight.131
To reach the conclusion that these statements are not susceptible to
a libel suit because they are not "factual," one must accept the proposi-
tion that even words with stable meanings can have a wide variance in
interpretation depending on context and tenor. The Milkovich Court, by
requiring an examination of context and tenor, recognizes that the mean-
ing of words is always subject to interpretation depending on context.
Some words and phrases have a greater potential for variance, as they are
commonly used, than others. For instance, the words "beautiful" and
"ugly" are usually subject to much greater variance in meaning than the
words "open" and "shut." Words, phrases, and statements with the po-
tential for especially wide variance in interpretation are bad candidates
for libel suits because the plaintiff or defendant will be unable to "prove"
as true or false any one interpretation.
Roughly speaking, those statements with the potential for wide vari-
ance in interpretation are "opinion," while those statements with the
least potential for reasonable interpretation are "fact." Because context
results i a myriad of interpretative possibilities, a set determination of
130. The problem of what to do with a statement that contains both constitutionally protected
opinion and factual content is more fully discussed in Part Three.
131. These phrases were "ranting from the side of the mat," "egging the crowd on," "wild ges-
tures," and the statement that this behavior "backfired... and resulted ... in a brawl." D iadiun,
supra note 41, at 39.
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which words are fact and which words are opinion is impossible. In a
constitutional setting, however, the determinative factor is reasonable-
ness. Thus, "facts" are contained in those statements that in context
have a suitably narrow range of interpretation such that juries can rea-
sonably decide if the meaning conveyed by the statement corresponds as
"true" or "false" to a state of events.
Absent context, there is no formula for deciding which phrases are
sufficiently limited in meaning to be the potential subject of a libel suit.
Rather, as the Court indicates in Milkovich, the context, tenor, and prov-
ability of each challenged statement must always be examined. 132 Doing
just that with the phrases "ranting," "egging on," "wild gestures," and
the core assertion that all of these things "resulted" in the "brawl," does
not yield nearly the requisite level of "objective" fact that the Court man-
dates. If, for instance, the coach said, "Go get 'em" in a loud voice, does
this constitute "egging on"? What if the coach said that he always yells
"Go get 'em" before a meet and there had never been a fight before?
What if Diadiun could call as a witness a sixteen-year-old fan who would
testify that upon hearing the coach yell "Go get 'em" he felt an. irresisti-
ble urge to pummel the opposing team's members? What if the coach
said he always raised his arms as signals to his players? What if Diadiun
sincerely believed that waving one's arms around is the same as making
"wild gestures"?
Or, to go to the heart of the matter, who can conclusively say what
action or events led to the altercation? Where a series of underlying facts
are undisputed and made plain to the reader, and the conflict revolves
around an evaluation of these underlying facts, there is no "objective"
method of proving the evaluation right or wrong. The Milkovich Court
states that where "the speaker states the facts upon which he bases his
opinion, if those facts are either incorrect or incomplete, or his assess-
ment of them is erroneous, the statement may still imply a false assertion
of fact."1 33 Yet the presence of an "erroneous" assessment is not suffi-
cient to trigger a potential libel action, unless the "erroneous" assessment
implies the existence of facts that turn out to be false. The question of
the "truthfulness" of the evaluation itself is one of reasonableness in in-
terpretation subject to differences in assessment from individual to indi-
vidual. If no "false" statement of fact is implied by an evaluative
statement, even if the speaker's assessment is "erroneous" in the eyes of a
court, the statement cannot constitutionally be considered libel.
132. See Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2707.
133. Id at 2706.
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The characterization of events leading up to the altercation in
Milkovich is just such an individual evaluation. Dozens of witnesses saw
Milkovich's gestures and heard his words. One might imagine that the
event was videotaped. Even with such strong evidence of what occurred
at the match, it remains an individual judgment whether or not the net
effect of Milkovich's gestures and words was to encourage the alterca-
tion. The opinion content of this judgment is akin to a critic calling a
singer's voice "flat," or a restaurant reviewer labeling soup "lousy." 134
There is no "right" or "wrong" answer to such an individual judgment,
and Milkovich wisely leaves wide freedom for individuals to make evalu-
ative statements not provable as "true" or "false."
II. BAD APPLES: MISUSES OF MLKOVICH
Failure to recognize that the Milkovich holding only applies to those
statements that can be reasonably described as carrying direct or implied
fact content has already led to significant confusion. Two law review
treatments of Milkovich and a recent decision by the Wyoming Supreme
Court are illustrative.' 35
Professor Anthony D'Amato, in his essay Harmful Speech and the
Culture of Indeterminacy, explains at length how "the core of objective
evidence" required by Milkovich cannot determine whether Milkovich's
characterization of the fight was, in fact, a "lie." 36 Yet D'Amato does
not recognize the necessary implication of his observation: The Supreme
Court did not intend the lower court, on remand, to reach such a
determination.
D'Amato's apparent assumption is that the holding applies to all
statements in the column and to all levels of interpretation of all the
statements. He chooses as an example of the scope of Milkovich the col-
umn's "shrugging allegation," and he demonstrates (successfully I be-
lieve) that the opinion content of a charge of "shrugging" versus
"ranting" does not leave the statement open to factual analysis. 137
D'Amato writes that although Milkovich "is in the best position to
know what he is doing," Diadiun might have interpreted Milkovich's
behavior differently from the way in which Milkovich interpreted his
134. For a more rigorous analysis of why language can mean different things at different times,
see WrrrGENSTEIN, supra note 1, and J.L. AusTIN, How To Do THINGS WITH WORDS 143 (2d ed.
1975) ("It is essential to realize that 'true' and 'false' like 'free' and 'unfree,' do not stand for any-
thing simple at all; but only for a general dimension of being a right or proper thing to say as
opposed to a wrong thing, in these circumstances, to this audience, for these purposes and with these
intentions.").
135. See D'Amato, supra note 3; Stem, supra note 3; Spence v. Flynt, 816 P.2d 771 (Wyo. 1991).
136. See D'Amato, supra note 3, at 339.
137. See id. at 346.
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own behavior.138 Although "Milkovich may well have thought he was
shrugging [and], may well have tried to shrug ... perhaps Diadiun's
statement should be interpreted only as saying, 'I saw Milkovich ranting;
he later told the court he was shrugging, but it sure looked like ranting to
me.' "119 According to D'Amato, the distinction between actor and ob-
server necessarily signals to a reader that the observer's comments about
the actor are not based on the actor's internal beliefs. "[W]e cannot cred-
ibly conclude that Diadiun's statement that Milkovich was lying was
anything other than an abbreviated and hyperbolic way of saying, 'I saw
him ranting even though.., he may have thought he was only shrug-
ging,'" D'Amato asserts. 14° Thus, neither Diadiun's nor Milkovich's
opposing interpretations of the same event is provable as "false," and a
descriptive statement regarding the event could only be "opinion."
D'Amato analyzes the fact/opinion distinction in Diadiun's column
cogently, but despite this he does not realize which passages in Diadiun's
column the Court instructed the lower court to assess. For instance,
D'Amato recognizes that if Milkovich consistently lied from the first to
the second hearing, then a comparison of the two transcripts would not
reveal the "lie."141 D'Amato apparently has in mind the "lie" concern-
ing the fight. But D'Amato does not realize that if Milkovich's testi-
mony was consistent, then Diadiun's column was inaccurate in asserting
that Milkovich "polished and reconstructed" his testimony, another as-
pect of the "lie" accusation. And this assertion could easily be tested by
comparing the testimony at the two hearings.
D'Amato's overinclusive reading of the range of statements impli-
cated by Milkovich leads him to conclude:
On remand, the Supreme Court gave Milkovich no guidance. He has
no way to prove he was telling the truth to the trial judge. Similarly,
the Court gave Diadiun no guidance. All he can do is repeat his story
that he saw Milkovich ranting, not shrugging, and that he said so in
his column. 142
D'Amato asks rhetorically: "And is not the reporter entitled to
state his own opinion that Milkovich lied both to the Board and to the
common pleas court when Milkovich told them that he had only
shrugged?" 143 D'Amato believes Milkovich answers this question in the
negative. But a closer look at Milkovich reveals the answer to be "yes."
138. Id. at 345-46.
139. Id. at 345.
140. Id. at 345-46.
141. See id. at 341.
142. Id. (footnote omitted).
143. Id. at 341-42.
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Such an opinion cannot be proven true or false from a "core of objective
evidence" and thus is constitutionally protected from defamation actions.
Professor Nat Stem, in his article Defamation, Epistemology, and
the Erosion (But Not Destruction) of the Opinion Privilege, states that
Milkovich represents an "ominous" tilting toward "the less skeptical" of
the methods previously used by lower courts to determine a statement's
factual content. 144 Despite this assertion, Stem recognizes that the
Milkovich Court did not change the Court's previous constitutional stan-
dard. He writes, "the Court has jettisoned the terminology rather than
the essence of the fact-opinion distinction." 145 Stem's concern, then,
stems not from any change in the law, but from what he calls "the
Court's preference for a particular way of reading the facts" 146 of the
Diadiun column. In fact, it is Stem's apparent misreading of the Court's
application of the law to the Diadiun column that gives rise to Stem's
assertion that "Milkovich may provide momentum to a more subtle ex-
pansion of the range of expression subject to successful defamation
suits." 147
Professor Stem seems to operate under much the same assumption
as D'Amato. Stem argues that "having conceded that [Diadiun's] first-
hand knowledge was limited to observations made at the wrestling meet
and the OHSAA hearing, Diadiun could also have been viewed simply as
offering the conclusion--'conjecture'-that he had drawn from the infor-
mation set forth in his column."1 48 Instead, Stem states that Diadiun is
"held accountable for the most severe construction that could be placed
on [his] words."1 49 Stem does not specify the meaning of "severe con-
struction" that he has in mind, but from his mention of Diadiun's first-
hand observations at the meet, Stem implies that the "severe construc-
tion" to which Diadiun will be held "accountable" relates to Diadiun's
characterization of the fight at the wrestling meet. However, this is not a
construction that the Supreme Court's instruction permits-at least in so
far as identifying the meaning of the challenged Diadiun passage that
may properly be the subject of a libel suit.
Stem goes on to say that courts concluding that a statement has
factual content "bear a special responsibility to delineate precisely"150
the nature of the facts. He asserts that Milkovich fails "to confine more
144. See Stem, supra note 3, at 595.
145. Id at 614.
146. Id. at 615.
147. Id. at 616.
148. Id. at 623.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 624.
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clearly the universe of permissible implications [giving] unfortunate en-
couragement to judicial inclinations to find implied factual assertions on
an unpredictable basis."'151 Stem's concern is understandable. After all,
Chief Justice Rehnquist does not go through the allegedly defamatory
statements line by line to separate the provable facts from the protected
opinions. Ultimately, however, it is not an exceedingly difficult task to
make one's own delineation given the Court's precisely articulated
method of applying the Milkovich holding to the facts of the case. To the
extent that Stem suggests that the Court's articulated method is capable
of yielding anything more than a demonstration of whether Milkovich
changed his testimony, then Stem is mistaken and he may mislead others
into believing that Milkovich encourages libel suits based on statements
of "pure" opinion.
Stem is also mistaken when he argues that "[p]erhaps the most omi-
nous aspect" of Milkovich is the Court's "apparent enthusiastic em-
brace" of the Restatement. 152 Stem cites a section of the Court's opinion
that details the historical background of libel to justify his conclusions.153
Although the section does extensively quote the Restatement, the Court
uses the Restatement here only to summarize the historical development
of the common law.154 Subsequently, the Court states that "[lt is wor-
thy of note that at common law" the principle of fair comment did not
protect false statements of fact, quoting the Restatement's summation of
the common law.155 Neither of these instances suggests that the Court is
"enthusiastic[ally] embrac[ing]" the common law as representative of the
state of constitutional doctrine.15 6 Quite the contrary. Immediately fol-
lowing the historical discussion of the Restatement, the Milkovich Court
states that, since 1964, the Supreme Court has "placed [constftutional]
limits on the application of the state law of defamation."1 57 Stem's cri-
tique of the Restatement approach then, is not a critique of Milkovich.
As previously argued, Milkovich might actually necessitate the enlarge-
ment of the Restatement protection of opinion statements.
15 8
Perhaps the most troubling example of a misreading of Milkovich is
found in a recent Wyoming Supreme Court decision, Spence v. Flynt.
159
Spence involved a defamation action brought by attorney Gerry Spence
151. Id at 623-24.
152. Id at 617.
153. See id at 617 (citing Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2702-03).
154. See Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2702-03.
155. Id. at 2706.
156. See Stem, supra note 3, at 617.
157. Id at 2703.
158. See supra text accompanying notes 105-06.
159. 816 P.2d 771 (Wyo. 1991).
Vol. 41:415]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
against Hustler magazine. Hustler featured a story about Spence in its
July 1985 issue. The story attacked Spence, and in the course of the
attack made Spence the subject of a great many vulgarities. 16°
In its opinion, the Wyoming Supreme Court states that "Milkovich
laid to rest the absurd notion that anything published that is couched in
opinion language cannot be defamation ... ."161 The Spence court then
states that Milkovich "affords legal immunity for the honest expression of
opinion on matters of legitimate public interest when based upon a true
or privileged statement of fact" 162-a holding Spence asserts Milkovich
justifies based on "fair comment" doctrine.163
Spence represents such a serious misreading of Milkovich that it is
difficult to choose where to begin a rebuttal, but let me start with a refu-
tation of the Wyoming court's description of the Milkovich holding.
First, Chief Justice Rehnquist in no way relies on the fair comment doc-
trine, which is part of common law, as a basis for the Milkovich holding.
Although "fair comment" is mentioned as part of the historical discus-
sion of defamation,164 the Court entirely relies on constitutional decisions
in ruling that statements of public concern may not be the subject of
defamation unless they contain "a provably false factual connotation." 165
Thus, before the Spence court can assert that the Hustler statement is
defamatory, it must conclude that the statement can be proven true or
false. The common law presumption that defamatory speech is false was
ruled unconstitutional by Hepps, as reiterated by Milkovich. 166
The Spence court also is mistaken in stating that Milkovich only
protects an "honest expression of opinion" based on "true" facts. The
Spence court seems to imply that dishonest expressions of opinion based
on true facts are not protected, although the court does not attempt to
explain just how an opinion can be dishonest if it is based exclusively on
"true" facts, and does not, by virtue of its evaluative nature, imply any
additional untrue facts. Milkovich leaves no room for the possibility that
an opinion that does not in some manner imply untrue facts can be con-
sidered libelous, even if the lower court believes the opinion not to be
"honest."
Most critically, the Spence court fails to mention the Milkovich re-
quirement that a statement be provably false before it can be libelous.
160. For the full text of the story, see id at 773.
161. Id at 775.
162. d
163. Id at 774-75.
164. See Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2703.
165. Id at 2706.
166. Id at 2704 (quoting Hepps, 475 U.S. at 777).
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Such an inquiry reveals that none of the direct or implied factual (as
opposed to opinion) assertions in the Hustler story could hold Spence up
to "hatred, contempt, or ridicule." 167 A review of the Hustler story will
make this plain.
First, the story identifies lawyers as a parasitic group "eager to sell
out their personal values, truth, justice and our hard-won freedoms for a
chance to fatten their wallets." 168 Next, the story identifies Spence as a
lawyer and notes that although he holds himself out as a "country law-
yer" he is actually rich and owns a large ranch. 169 The column then
states that Hustler is among those Spence has sued and that he is seeking
$150 million from the magazine on behalf of radical feminist Andrea.
Dworkin.170 All of the above is accomplished with substantially more
vulgarity than represented here, but not one of the essential opinions or
facts, implied or directly stated, is omitted. Isolating just the facts, the
article states that Spence portrays himself as a little guy, but he is in fact
wealthy and is suing Hustler on behalf of Andrea Dworkin. These fac-
tual assertions, however, are obviously not what bothers Spence. First,
Spence would probably concede that all of the above facts are true; even
if he did not, the portrayal of one's self as a country lawyer while being
rich and suing Hustler magazine on behalf of a well-known feminist
hardly seems the stuff that holds one up to "hatred, contempt, or ridi-
cule." Rather, the defamation action seems motivated by the story's vul-
garly presented accusations that Spence is greedy and has sold out his
"personal values, truth, justice and our-hard-won freedoms" for the pur-
suit of large sums of money.' 71 It should be obvious that there is no
"fact" at stake in these accusations that can be decided by a "core of
objective evidence."' 72 No judge or jury can decide as a factual matter if
a lawyer's pursuit of a $150 million verdict makes the lawyer greedy or a
sell-out. Milkovich forbids such an inquiry as a matter of constitutional
law.
Furthermore, Milkovich in. no way suggests that vulgarity, by itself,
can be the subject of a defamation action. The opposite is true. Because
vulgarity, by itself, typically has no provable fact content, but instead
represents only an individual's personal judgment about another,
Milkovich generally protects such statements from defamation actions. 73
167. See Spence, 816 P.2d at 776.
168. Id. at 772.
169. See id. at 773.
170. See id
171. See id,
172. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2707.
173. The Restatement (Second) of Torts takes the position that vulgarity ordinarily cannot be
reasonably understood as asserting a fact. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 cmt. e
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III. ROADS NOT TRAVELED: THE POSSIBILITY OF MULTIPLE
REASONABLE INTERPRETATIONS
The confusion generated by Milkovich leads to a related question:
What if the same sentence can be read as conveying fact and opinion
simultaneously, or as conveying only opinion, or as conveying only fact,
depending on what interpretative lens is used in the reading? Consider
the following statement: "While Jack's wife was away on business, he
slept over at Marie's house." Suppose the statement is made in the con-
text of a discussion of Marie's kindness to her friends. Where either an
exclusively non-libelous interpretation (e.g., the literal meaning of the
words) or a libelous interpretation (e.g., that Marie and Jack engaged in
an extramarital affair) is reasonable, I argue in this Part that the exclu-
sively non-libelous interpretation should preclude an action for libel,
even if a reader later infers defamatory meaning.
The question might be viewed as follows: Does the presence of a
reasonable, exclusively non-libelous interpretation (that is, an interpreta-
tion in which a potentially libelous meaning need not be part of a reason-
able reader's interpretation) of a statement preclude the statement from
being held defamatory? I think so, but the demonstration of this might
not be obvious, especially where a reasonable libelous interpretation also
seems to be present. This Part offers both a First Amendment and a tort
method for analyzing statements with more than one reasonable
interpretation.
The analytical difficulty here stems from a linguistic difficulty-
more than one interpretation of a statement can be reasonable.1 74 For
the purposes of a libel action based on a media account of a matter of
public concern, however, the way out of this difficulty is contained by
assigned burdens of proof, as necessitated by the First Amendment. Re-
call that the Supreme Court has held that the First Amendment requires.
that the plaintiff bear the burden of showing falsity, as well as fault,
before damages can be recovered in a libel action.175
(1977). For instance, when an individual calls someone a "bastard" during an argument, then no
defamation action will lie, even though a factual assertion regarding parentage might be implied.
But the Restatement adds that because written vulgarity requires reflection by the writer, these writ-
ten vulgarities are intended to be taken seriously, and thus can be defamatory. In light of Milkovich,
this comment on written vulgaries is only valid where the vulgarity, in context, reasonably implies
actual fact content. That the vulgarity is written is not sufficient, by itself, reasonably to imply
actual fact content. Because the Spence court makes no attempt to provide a factual analysis of the
vulgar Hustler statements, it fails to meet the constitutional standard required under Milkovich.
174. See infra text accompanying notes 130-34.
175. See Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 776 (1986). I leave unexamined,
in this Note, the implications thay may stem from the "actual malice" burden imposed in cases
involving public figures.
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If the reasonable reader could interpret a statement as conveying an
exclusively non-libelous meaning, the plaintiff will be unable to prove by
a preponderance of the evidence that the libelous reading is "more" rea-
sonable. Once the threshold of reasonableness is met by any exclusively
non-libelous interpretation, the presence of a reasonable libelous inter-
pretation does not negate the reasonableness of the non-libelous interpre-
tation. The exclusively non-libelous reasonable interpretation, absent
evidence of defamatory intent, will always carry at least equal weight
with the libelous interpretation, making it impossible as a matter of law
for the libelous interpretation to be proven "more" reasonable. Nonethe-
less, allowing a jury to consider such a case invites a decision on the basis
of which reasonable interpretation the jury prefers, and not whether the
non-libelous reading is reasonable and complete without a necessary al-
ternative libelous interpretation.
One may also view this question from the perspective of tort law.
Namely, is it reasonably foreseeable that a statement would be inter-
preted with a defamatory meaning? The presence of a reasonable, exclu-
sively non-libelous interpretation shows that the defamatory meaning is
not reasonably foreseeable. Such a non-libelous interpretation means
that the writer could reasonably have made the assertion without convey-
ing any other meaning to reasonable readers. The fact that an additional
meaning may have been conveyed does not mean that the language used
made the additional meaning foreseeable. Thus, the writer might reason-
ably make such an assertion without foreseeing any other interpretation.
Proof of the writer's intent to defame would mean that the writer
did foresee the libelous interpretation, despite any reasonable, exclusively
non-libelous interpretation. 176 By this, I do not mean to suggest that
proof of a writer's defamatory intent is always constitutionally necessary
to prove that an opinion statement is capable of being interpreted with
direct or implied factual content. No such proof of intent would be
needed to show that a writer foresaw a defamatory meaning where an
exclusively non-libelous interpretation of a statement is not reasonable.
176. It might be argued that a writer's intent should be irrelevant to this discussion, and that the
sole focus should be the reasonableness (or foreseeability, in tort analysis) of an interpretation as
gauged by the reasonable reader. Because the reader is unaware of any intent on the writer's part
not conveyed by the expression itself, the writer's non-expressed intent does not influence the
reader's interpretation and does not add (or detract) from any potential defamatory meaning. How-
ever, in those instances where it can be demonstrated that a writer was aware of a defamatory
interpretation, despite the presence of an alternative, exclusively non-defamatory reasonable inter-
pretation, then the writer can argue less persuasively that her statement was reasonably non-defama-
tory. Perhaps this is just another way of stating that proof of intent to defame is evidence that a non-
defamatory interpretation is not the exclusive interpretation.
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For example, suppose the basis of a libel action is the false written state-
ment "Jack didn't sleep with his wife last night, he slept with Marie,"
where the statement is made in the context of a discussion of extramarital
affairs, but no intent of the writer can be shown. The statement can
plainly be interpreted in at least two ways, one of which is non-defama-
tory: Jack sleeping (and only sleeping) with Marie. Nevertheless, the
non-defamatory interpretation is not exclusive-it is unreasonable, in
this context, to make the assertion that "sleep with" need not mean "to
conduct an extramarital affair with." Thus, the non-libelous interpreta-
tion should not save this writer from a libel action (assuming all other
constitutional requirements, such as falsity, are also met).
Consider the following model. 177 Suppose X is a road builder. X
builds road A. Some time later paths B and C are beat off of road A. At
the time X built A, she knew it adjoined a popular baseball stadium and
it was foreseeable that passersby would try to beat a path (path B) to the
stadium despite X's failure to do so. But X did not know, and could not
reasonably have been expected to know, that some years later a popular
movie theater would also be built in the vicinity of road A, leading pass-
ersby to beat path C off of A.
If three pedestrians have three separate accidents on A, B and C,
and they each sue X for negligence, what outcome should result? Cer-
tainly X can be held liable for the negligent construction of A. And
given the foreseeability of the creation of path B, it would also probably
be reasonable to hold X liable for injury resulting from negligence associ-
ated with path B (e.g., not posting a suitable warning sign, or building a
fence). But X should not be held responsible for an accident on path C,
because such an accident was not reasonably foreseeable to X.
I mean to equate road A with a speaker's intended linguistic mean-
ing, path B with a (libelous or non-libelous) reasonable interpretation of
A, and path C with an unintended, but reasonable, libelous interpretation
of A. Although C is as real as A and B, X should not be held accounta-
ble for this unforseen (to her) interpretation. The central analogy is this:
To those who beat path C, a novel interpretation, off of road A, the new
path is a reasonable outcome from road A. Yet road A's builder need
not have foreseen path C at all and should not be held accountable for an
"accident" occurring due to path C.
177. The model is inspired by WrrGENSTEIN, supra note 1, § 85 ("A rule stands there like a
sign-post-Does the sign post leave no doubt open about the way I have to go? Does it shew which
direction I am to take when I have passed it; whether along the road or the footpath or cross-
country?").
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The word "exclusive" is critical to this entire argument. If the rea-
sonable reader must see a defamatory as well as a non-defamatory inter-
pretation, then the statement is not susceptible to an exclusive non-
defamatory interpretation and should still be subject to libel suit. This is
the case in Diadiun's column. Although at certain points in the column
it is not clear if the "lie" being referred to is the alleged change in testi-
mony or Milkovich's description of the fight, given Diadiun's explicit
mention of both accusations, both interpretations of the term "lie" are
reasonably foreseeable. Only one of the two interpretations is potentially
defamatory as an implied factual statement. But because the non-defama-
tory interpretation is not exclusive, Diadiun is still reasonably subject to
a libel suit, assuming the implied facts are shown to be false and
defamatory.
Suppose the column made no mention of the alleged change in testi-
mony or to the due process nature of the Court of Common Pleas hear-
ing, but a court nonetheless interpreted the "lie" as referring to altered
testimony. Because the court hearing was, in fact, solely concerned with
due process, and the fight need not even have been discussed, such an
interpretation might be reasonable to someone who independently of the
article was familiar with the court hearing and nature of legal meth-
ods. 178 But if a reasonable reader looking at the article by itself could
interpret the alleged "lie" as only referring to the fight, then this reason-
able and exclusively non-defamatory (because it is a "pure" opinion)
statement, should be exempt from a libel action, notwithstanding the al-
ternative understanding reached by the other reader.
IV. CONCLUSION
In his dissent to Olman v. Evans,179 then-Judge Scalia stated that
"it is a normal human reaction, after painstakingly examining and re-
jecting thirty invalid and almost absurd contentions, to reject the thirty-
first contention as well, and make a clean sweep of the matter."180 None-
theless, Scalia made the point that a single defamatory statement should
not escape liability just because it is buried among dozens of non-defama-
tory statements.181 But Scalia warned plaintiffs that wasting a court's
178. See Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2714 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[Tio anyone who knows what
'due process' means, it does not follow that- the court must have believed some lie about what hap-
pened at the wrestling meet, because what happened at the meet would not have been germane to the
questions at issue.").
179. 750 F.2d 970 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985).
180. Id at 1036 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
181. See id. at 1035.
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time with a long list of obviously non-defamatory statements risks having
the one actually defamatory passage lost in the fray.18 2
With Milkovich, the problem that Scalia identified in Olman has
come full circle. Just because one potentially defamatory implied fact is
found among a litany of protected opinions does not mean that all of the
opinions in the challenged statement are potentially defamatory.
Read properly, Milkovich represents an affirmation of the constitu-
tional protection for statements of opinion. Given the intermingling of
fact and opinion in nearly any controversial statement, however, the task
is not easy for a trial court faced with a defamation action based on an
expression containing facts-some impliedly stated, some directly
stated-and opinions. But it is the constitutional responsibility of the
trial court not to allow "pure" expressions of opinion to become the sub-
ject of the trial. The limitation of evidence and arguments to the factual
or implied factual assertions contained in a statement is essential to keep
a jury (or judge) from being tempted to condemn a speaker for her point
of view, and not for a defamatory falsehood.
182. Id.
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